With the continuous development of the industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), many organizations opt for storing the data collected by smart devices on a cloud server for saving costs. Considering the untrusted nature of the communication channel, how to ensure the authenticity of data is an urgent matter to be solved. Certificateless signatures that can provide an authentication mechanism for the data seem to be a viable option to this problem. Nevertheless, the certificateless signature scheme proposed so far is either easy to be broken or inefficient. In this paper, a pairing-free and provably secure certificateless parallel key-insulated signature (CL-PKIS) scheme is put forward for securing the communication in the IIoT environment. Unlike previous work in this field, our scheme not only uses elliptic curves to maintain higher efficiency, but also implants key-insulated primitive to reduce the risk of key exposures. Besides, our scheme provides a parallel mechanism to make it more suitable for the IIoT environment, which was not available in previous solutions. Finally, the security of our CL-PKIS scheme is proved under the discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle model. Index Terms-Certificateless signature, industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), key insulated, random oracle model.
improve the manufacturing efficiency and product quality, reduce product costs as well as resource consumption, ultimately promote the traditional industry to a new stage of intelligence [3] . By considering the large amount of data gathered by the smart devices in the IIoT, the storage and processing of big data emerges as a serious challenge. Fortunately, the cloud computing [4] , [5] is considered to be a promising solution to this problem. As one of the internet-based computing paradigms, cloud computing has the merits of virtually unlimited storage, powerful processing capacity, high availability, and low cost. In the cloud-assisted IIoT, smart things exploit the powerful storage and computing capabilities of cloud computing to address the aforementioned challenge.
While the combination of IIoT and cloud computing brings many benefits, how to ensure the authenticity of data is one of the most serious obstacles to widespread deployment and adoption of the IIoT [6] , [7] . In general, communication channels between cloud servers and smart devices are considered untrustworthy and it is not easy to guarantee the authenticity of data during transmission. Without the appropriate authentication mechanism, a malicious adversary is potentially able to intercept, modify, inject, or replay the data collected by the smart things and perform a series of attacks. This can result in the catastrophic damage to both the data owners and data consumers [8] , [9] . For the sake of ensuring authenticity, data could be signed before being outsourced to the cloud server. So far, many public key infrastructure (PKI)-or identity (ID)-based digital signature schemes are adopted in this scenario [10] , [11] .
In a PKI-based signature system, the user's identity is bound to the corresponding public key through a certificate that is issued by a trusted certificate authority. However, in view of the huge overhead caused by the certificate management, PKIbased signature schemes are not applicable to IIoT. Therefore, ID-based signature schemes are proposed to ease this problem [12] . In the ID-based signature, users' public keys are their unique identity information that is publicly known, while the user's private key is created by a private key generator (PKG) with a master secret key. In this manner, the necessity of the certificate is eliminated in the ID-based signature because the public key of the user can be derived from his/her identity information directly. Since the private key of all users is calculated by the PKG, the signature of any entity can be forged easily by the PKG, which results in a notorious key escrow problem. In order to deal with key escrow problem in the ID-based 1937-9234 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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signature, the notion of the certificateless signature (CLS) along with a concrete construction was proposed [13] , which integrates the merits of the PKI-based signature scheme and ID-based signature system. Specifically, the private key of the user in the CLS scheme consists of two independent part, i.e., the partial private key issued by a semi-trusted key generation center (KGC) and the user him/herself. The key escrow problem in the ID-based signature has been elegantly solved since the KGC does not own the knowledge of the user secret key. On the other hand, the public key of the user in the CLS scheme is derived from the public known identity and the public key generated by the user him/herself. Similar to the ID-based signature, the certificate is unnecessary in the CLS to authenticate the user since the public key derived from the public information. Since the initial introduction of the CLS in the seminar work in [13] , several efficient CLS schemes [14] [15] [16] [17] based on bilinear pairings were proposed with the aim of reducing the amount of pairing operations in the process of signing or verifying the algorithm. For the sake of further enhancing the CLS's efficiency, He and Zhang [18] presented a CLS scheme without pairings. Inspired by the scheme in [18] , many pairings-free CLS schemes were put forward successively [19] [20] [21] [22] . Fairly, recently, Karati et al. [23] introduced a lightweight CLS scheme for IIoT environments, whose security was theoretically proven by using the idea of the random oracle model. However, after careful observation, this paper indicates that Karati et al.'s scheme failed to provide the appropriate security. Another challenge encountered in the IIoT deployment and adoption is the key exposure. In the IIoT environment, the key exposure seems inevitable as signature operations are performed more frequently on insecured devices. There is no doubt that key exposure will leads to the catastrophic consequence. Namely, all security guarantees in the IIoT environment are lost. The primitive of key insulated, first proposed by Dodis et al. [24] , is an effective technique to alleviate the catastrophic damage induced by the key exposure. In their scheme, multiple discrete periods make up the system's whole lifetime. During the lifetime of a system, the user's public key remains unchanged. There are two types of secret keys for users, which are named user secret key and helper key. The former one is evolved with the time period and used to perform the signing operation, whereas the latter one is issued by a physical secure device, known as helper, and used to update the former one in each time period. Because the user secret key has been constantly changing, its exposure will only cause damage in the corresponding period of time without affecting the security of other time periods. After that, Dodis et al. came up with a key-insulated signature scheme [25] . Following the works of Dodis et al. [24] , [25] , some well-designed schemes have been constructed. Du et al. [26] put forward a certificate-based signature (CB-KIS) with the function of key insulation that simplifies the certificate management. Li et al. [27] extended the CB-KIS on the basis of [26] and formalized the definition as well as security model. Independent of the ideas of Li et al., Wan et al. [28] combined the function of key insulation with certificateless primitive to propose a certificateless key-insulated signature (CL-KIS). Later, Wan et al. [29] proposed a new CL-KIS scheme with strong key insulated and proved security in the random oracle. Nevertheless, Chen et al. [30] and Lu et al. [31] independently pointed that under the malicious key generation center attack, the scheme in [28] cannot guarantee security, then they proposed an improved scheme of the CL-KIS, respectively.
However, the aforementioned schemes are only suitable for a mechanism with a single helper. Specifically, the temporary private key must be updated at short timing to increase the tolerance of the system for key exposure. Unfortunately, this increases the frequency with which the helper connects to an unsafe environment, thereby, increasing the probability of the helper key exposure. To solve this problem, a new key-insulated scheme with parallel mechanism was put forward by Hanaoka et al. [32] . In their scheme, two independent helper keys are used for updating the decryption keys one by one. The advantage of this scheme is that it can reduce the chance of exposing the helper key while allowing the decryption key to be updated frequently, thus the security of the system is improved.
Aiming at the aforementioned problems, this paper proposes an efficient pairing-free and secure certificateless parallel keyinsulated signature (CL-PKIS) scheme for the IIoT environment. The contribution of this paper are as follows.
1) This paper first reveals the insecurity of the CLS scheme in [23] , by demonstrating the forgery attack as well as the reason why their scheme is easily broken. 2) Next, this paper proposes an efficient CL-PKIS scheme, whose security proof is provided in the random oracle model under the discrete logarithm (DL) assumption.
3) Finally, theoretical analysis and experimental simulation
show that the proposed scheme has high efficiency and practicality. This paper is structured as follows: some preliminaries including elliptic curve, complexity assumption, system framework, and security notions are introduced in Section II. Section III briefly analyzes Karati et al.'s scheme, and then, displays a forgery attack about their scheme. A concrete CL-PKIS scheme and associated security proof are demonstrated in Section IV. Section V provides the performance evaluation. Section VI summarizes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, some preliminaries related to bilinear maps, elliptic curve, and complexity assumptions are presented.
A. Elliptic Curve
Let EC denote an elliptic curve and F p denote a prime finite field. EC over F p can be represented through the cubic equation
The set of all points P = (x, y) over E c and an additional point at infinity, O, constitute an additive cyclic group G under the point addition "+" explained by a tangent and chord method: Let P and Q be two random elements of the group G. l is a line that contains P, Q (tangent line to EC if P = Q) and another point R intersected of l with EC. l denotes the line that connects R and parallels to the y-axis. When the line l intersect with EC to get a point R , we can define P + Q = R ∈ E c . In addition, we define a scalar multiplication through the equation tP = (P + P + · · · + P t times ).
B. Bilinear Map
Given an additive group G 1 and a multiplicative group G 2 of the same prime order q. Let P be a generator of G 1 . The bilinear mapê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 should satisfy the following properties. 1) Bilinearity: For ∀x, y ∈ Z * q ,ê : (xP, yP ) =ê : (P, P ) xy . 2) Non-degeneracy:ê : (P, P ) = 1.
3) Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute bilinear mapê :
C. Complexity Assumption 1) DL Problem [22] : Given two elements P, Q of the group G such that Q = αP , where α ∈ Z * p , the DL problem is to calculate α.
2) Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem [29] : Given a tuple < P, aP, bP >∈ G, where a, b ∈ Z * p , P ∈ G, the CDH problem is to calculate abP .
3) Square Computational Diffie-Hellman (Squ-CDH) Problem [31] : Given a tuple < P, aP >∈ G, where a ∈ Z * p , P ∈ G, the Squ-CDH problem is to calculate a 2 P . 4) Bilinear Strong Diffie-Hellman (BSDH) Problem [33] : Given a tuple < P, aP, a 2 P, . . . , a q P >, where a ∈ Z * q . For known b ∈ Z * q , the BSDH problem is to calculate T = (b, e(P, P ) 1 a + b ) . [23] : Given a tuple < P, aP, a 2 P, . . . , a q P >, where a ∈ Z * q . For known b ∈ Z * q , the BSDH problem is to calculate T = (b, e(P, P ) a a + b ).
5) Extended Bilinear Strong Diffie-Hellman (EBSDH) Problem

D. Outline of the CL-PKIS
A CL-PKIS scheme consists of seven different algorithms, which are as follows. 1) Setup: Upon inputting k as the security parameter, the KGC produces a master secret key msk and the public parameters params. 2) Extract-Partial-Private-Key: Upon inputting params, msk, and an identity ID, the KGC produces the corresponding partial private key D I D . Next, the KGC returns D I D to the user ID. 3) Key-Gen: Upon inputting ID, params, and a time period t, a user computes the secret value x I D , an initial secret key USK I D ,0 and public key UP K I D for him/herself, and produces two helpers's public/private key pairs (HP K 0 , HSK 0 ) and (HP K 1 , HSK 1 ). 4) CL-Update * : Upon inputting params, ID, t, and the ith (here, i ≡ t mod 2) helper's private key HSK i , the ith helper produces an update key UK I D ,t . 5) CL-Update: Upon inputting params, t, ID, UK I D ,t , and a temporary signing key USK I D ,t−1 , a user calculates a temporary signing key USK I D ,t of the time period t. 6) CL-Sign: Upon inputting params, ID, t, USK I D ,t , and a message M , a signer produces a signature σ on the message M . 7) CL-Verify: Upon inputting params, ID, UP K I D ,
(HP K 0 , HP K 1 ), and a message-signature pair (M, σ), a verifier produces true or false to demonstrate signature σ's validity.
E. Security Model of the CL-PKIS
For the security of the CL-PKIS scheme, two types of adversaries whose capabilities differ from each other are considered in the game. The capability of adversary A I is to randomly replace any legitimate user's public key without knowing the system master key. While an adversary A II usually has the knowledge of the system master secret key, but is not allowed to replace the public key of target users. To better explain the attack ability of the adversaries, we first describe the oracles that the adversary A ∈ {A I , A II } can access.
1) Extract-Partial-Private-Key: After receiving ID, this oracle produces the user ID's partial private key D I D . 2) Extract-Public-Key: After receiving an identity ID, this oracle produces the user's public key UP K I D . 3) Set-Secret-Value: After receiving ID, this oracle produces the user ID's secret value x I D . 4) Public-Key-Replace: After receiving (ID, U P K I D ), a user ID's public key is replaced with UP K I D through this oracle. 5) Extract-Signing-Key: After receiving (ID, t), this oracle produces a temporary signing key USK I D ,t . 6) Sign: After receiving ID, t, UP K I D , the helpers' public key, and a message M , this oracle produces the corresponding valid signature (t, σ). Game I. Setup: A challenger B generates the master secret key msk and the public parameters params through performing the algorithm Setup. Next, B returns params to A I and keeps msk secret.
Query: A I can access polynomial times of those queries onto all oracles defined previously adaptively.
Forgery: After finishing all queries, adversary A I outputs a forged signature (t * , σ * ). A I will win the game if the forgery meets the following requirements.
1) A I has never supplied ID * to the oracle Extract-Partial-Private-Key. 2) A I has never supplied (ID * , t * ) to the oracle Extract-Signing-Key. 3) A I has never supplied (ID * , M * , t * ) to the oracle Sign. 4) true ← CL-Verify(params, ID * , UP K I D * , HP K 0 , HP K 1 , M * , (t * , σ * )). Definition 1: A CL-PKIS scheme is perfectly key-insulated secure if there does not exist probabilistic polynomial-time adversary (PPT) A I that wins Game I with non-negligible advantage.
Game II. Setup: A challenger B generates the master secret key msk and the public parameters params through performing the algorithm Setup. Next, B returns params to A I and keeps msk secret.
Query: A I can access polynomial times of those queries onto all oracles defined previously adaptively except the oracle Extract-Signing-Key. Moreover, A I can query adaptively the oracle Extract-Helper-Key described as follows.
1) Extract-Helper-Key: After receiving a time period t, this oracle produces two helpers's public/private key pairs (HP K 0 , HSK 0 ) and (HP K 1 , HSK 1 ) through the algorithm Key-Gen. Forgery: After finishing all queries, adversary A I outputs a forged signature (t * , σ * ). A I will win the game if the forgery meets the following requirements.
1) A I has never supplied ID * to the oracle Extract-Partial-Private-Key.
Game III. Setup: A challenger B generates the master secret key msk and the public parameters params through performing the algorithm Setup. Next, B returns params, msk to A II .
Query: A II can access polynomial times of those queries onto all oracles defined above adaptively.
Forgery: After finishing all queries, adversaryA II outputs a forged signature (t * , σ * ). A II will win the game if the forgery meets the following requirements.
1) A II has never supplied ID * to the oracle Set-Secret-Value.
2) A II has never supplied (ID * , t * ) to the oracle Extract-Signing-Key. 3) A II has never supplied (ID * , M * , t * ) to the oracle Sign. 4) true ← CL-Verify (params, ID * , UP K I D * , HP K 0 , HP K 1 , M * , (t * , σ * )). Definition 3: A CL-PKIS scheme is perfectly key-insulated secure if there does not exist PPT adversary A II that wins Game III with non-negligible advantage.
Game IV. Setup: A challenger B generates the master secret key msk and the public parameters params through performing the algorithm Setup. Next, B returns params, msk to A II .
Query: A II can access polynomial times of those queries onto all oracles defined previously adaptively except the oracle Extract-Signing-Key. Moreover, A II can query adaptively the oracle Extract-Helper-Key.
Forgery: After finishing all queries, adversary A II outputs a forged signature (t * , σ * ). A II will win the game if the forgery meets the following requirements.
1) A II has never supplied ID * to the oracle Set-Secret-Value. 2) A II has never supplied (ID * , M * , t * ) to the oracle Sign.
3) true ← CL-Verify(params, ID * , UP K I D * , HP K 0 , HP K 1 , M * , (t * , σ * )). [23] briefly. Then, a forgery attack is given to show that their CLS scheme is insecure against any outside attacker. 1) KGC: It produces the public parameters as well as the secret keys provided to data owner (DO) and data consumer (DC). 2) Cloud Server: It is an information processing platform, which is in charge of the users' data storing, computing, and transmitting. 3) DO: DO can sign the data with its full secret key and the public parameters. After successfully signing, the signed data will be stored on the cloud server. 4) DC: DC receives the signed data that comes from the cloud server, and then, could verify the signed data's authenticity with the public parameters and the signer's identity and public key.
A. Overview of Karati et al.'s CLS Scheme
1) Setup: KGC takes k as a security parameter, then executes the following operations for producing the master secret key msk and the public parameters params.
1) Randomly pick an additive cyclic group G 1 and a multiplicative cyclic group G 2 whose order are p > 2 k , and then, randomly pick a generator P ∈ G 1 . 2) Define a bilinear pairingê :
3) Randomly choose an integer y ∈ Z * p as the master secret key msk and keep msk = y secret. 4) Calculate Q =ê(P, P ) y , and set P KGC = y · P as the public key. 5) Output public parameters as params =< G 1 , G 2 , p,ê, P, Q, P KGC , H > .
2) Extract-Partial-Private-Key: After receiving params, msk, and an identify ID i , the KGC randomly selects r i ∈ R Z * p , and then, produce the partial private key D I D i as follows.
to the user with identity ID i . After receiving D I D i , the user ID i would verify the equation
If it holds, D I D i is valid.
3) Set-Secret-Value: After receiving params, a user ID i selects x i , c i ∈ R Z * p at random and calculates the secret value
4) Extract-Public-Key: After receiving params, x i , and c i , a user ID i calculates the public key UP
5) CL-Sign:
Given params and a signer's secret value SK S = (x S , c S , R S ), the signer can sign for a message M ∈
. Finally, the signer returns a signature σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) of the message M . 6) CL-Verify: After receiving a message-signature pair (M, σ) as well as a signer's public key UP K I D S , the algorithm can be executed by any verifier to check the following equation:
If it holds, the verifier will output true. Otherwise, the verifier will output false.
B. Forgery Attack of Karati et al.'s Scheme
Karati et al. alleged that their scheme [23] was secure and existentially unforgeable against the key replacement attack as well as malicious KGC attack. Unfortunately, we observe that it is not true. We will use a concrete attack example to demonstrate that the scheme in [23] is too vulnerable to achieve the security as they claimed. Specifically, any outside adversary can perform the following algorithms.
1) Randomly select k * ∈ R Z * p and calculate σ * 2 = k * · P .
2) Upon inputting a user's public key UP K S 1 , A can computê
3) Upon inputting a user's public key UP K S 2 , A can compute
4) For any message M * , A can output a signature σ * = (σ * 1 , σ * 2 ) under the identity ID * i and user's public key UP K I D i . From the aforementioned description, we can clearly know that the successfully forged signature σ * of message M * is valid. Besides, anyone can check the signature's validity through executing the algorithm CL-Verify as follows.
2) Check whether the equation (
holds. This verification will hold because of the following fact:
Thus, we can easily observe that Karati et al.'s CLS scheme cannot resist the forgery attack. The underlying reason of the fatal flaw in Karati et al.'s scheme is that the KGC's public key P K GC has not been embedded in the algorithm CL-Verify of their CLS scheme. What makes things worse, the first component σ 1 of the signature is one element in the group G 2 , whereas the second component σ 2 of the signature is one element of the group G 1 . In this way, we can directly calculate valid σ 1 according to the equation of the algorithm CL-Verify by the property of the bilinear pairing after σ 2 has been generated successfully. During the forgery, only the message M to be signed, identity ID and user public key UP K I D of the signer are needed. Therefore, there is an intrinsic weakness in Karati et al.'s CLS scheme.
IV. OUR PROPOSED CL-PKIS SCHEME
This section discusses a pairing-free CL-PKIS scheme and gives the concrete construction. After that, the security analysis is given to demonstrate that the CL-PKIS scheme we proposed achieves strong key-insulated security as well as existential unforgeability under the random oracle model.
A. Construction
A CL-PKIS scheme is composed of seven different algorithms with details described below. 1) Setup: After receiving the security parameter k, the KGC executes the following operations for producing the master secret key msk and the public parameters params.
1) Pick an additive group G whose order is p, and then randomly pick a generator P ∈ G. 2) Pick s ∈ Z * p as the master secret key msk, set msk = s and keep s secret.
3) Calculate the system public key P KGC = s · P . 4) Pick four secure hash functions: 3) Key-Gen: Upon receiving params, ID, and a time period t, a user with identity ID will compute his own initial secret key USK I D ,0 and public key UP K I D , and two helpers's public key (HP K 0 , HP K 1 ) and private key (HSK 0 , HSK 1 ) as follows.
1) Randomly pick x I D ∈ Z * p as the secret value, then compute the corresponding public key UP K I D = x I D · P . 2) Pick two integers s 0 , s 1 ∈ Z * p , set HSK 0 = s 0 and HSK 1 = s 1 , and calculate HP K 0 = s 0 · P and HP K 1 = s 1 · P , where (HSK 0 , HSK 1 ) denotes two helpers' private key and (HP K 0 , HP K 1 ) denote two helpers' public key. Finally, the user sends (HSK 0 , HSK 1 ) to helpers and deletes it from user. , σ) as well as the helpers' public key(HP K 0 , HP K 1 ), the algorithm verifies whether the equation w · P = U + v · (R I D + h I D · P K GC + l I D ,t−1 · HP K m + l I D ,t · (HP K m + k · UP K I D )) holds. If it holds, the algorithm will output true. Otherwise, the algorithm will output false.
The process of CL-PKIS scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2 . In a secure CLS scheme, both the partial private key and user secret key are needed for the signer to generate the valid signature. In this sense, the adversary who only owns either the partial private key (known as the adversary A II ) or the user secret key (known as the adversary A II ) is unable to forge a valid signature. Correspondingly, the master public key as well as the user public key should be explicitly used in the verification algorithm to ensure that the signature is calculated with the partial private key and the user secret key. Different from the scheme in [23] , to verify the validity of the signature, the user public key UP K I D and the master public key P KGC are needed in the verify algorithm, which implies that the user secret key and the partial private key are appropriately incorporated in the generation of the signature. In other words, our scheme is able to resist the forgery attack easily, which works for Karati et al.'s scheme.
B. Security Analysis
Theorem 1: The proposed CL-PKIS scheme is (t, )perfectly key-insulated secure against an adversary A I in Game I defined in Section II, assuming that the (t , )-DL assumption holds in G, where
Here, q H i , q P K , q S V q P P K , q P K R , q E S K , and q S denotes the number of queries to random oracles H i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, the oracle Extract-Public-Key, the oracle Set-Secret-Value, the oracle Extract-Partial-Private-Key, the oracle Public-Key-Replace, the oracle Extract-Signing-Key, and the oracle Sign, respectively, while O represents the time complexity.
Proof: Let P and Q be two elements of G with prime order p such that Q = αP , where α ∈ Z * p . Define that (P, Q) is a random DL problem's instance. B will simulate oracles and interact with A I to compute α.
Setup: B first initializes A I with P KGC = Q, then sends (P, P KGC ) to the adversary A I . Without loss of generality, an identity that involves in any extract key query or sign query is assumed that it has previously been queried on the H 1 (·) oracle. To respond A I 's oracle queries consistently, B maintains five lists L = {(ID, sk I D , , t) , B finds the corresponding value l 1 , l 2 , sets l 1 = H 3 (ID, R I D , t), l 2 = H 3 (ID, R I D , t − 1), and then, answers to A I with l 1 , l 2 . Otherwise, B selects randomly l 1 , l 2 ∈ Z * p , returns l 1 , l 2 to A I and inserts a tuple (ID, R I D , t, l 1 , l 2 ) into the list L 3 to keep track how it responds to this query. To respond the query, B will update the list L with (UP K I D , ⊥). 9) Extract-Signing-Key: When the tuple (ID, t) is delivered to this oracle, B maintains a list L h = {(ID, HSK 0 , HSK 1 , HP K 0 , HP K 1 )} and checks whether ID exists in L h . If not, B picks two random numbers hk 0 , hk 1 ∈ Z * p , and sets HSK 0 = hk 0 , HSK 1 = hk 1 , HP K 0 = hk 0 · P, and HP K 1 = hk 1 · P . Then, B will insert (ID, HSK 0 , HSK 1 , HP K 0 , HP K 1 ) into L h . Next, B performs H 1 query, H 2 query, and H 3 query, meanwhile, retrieves the list L. When t ≡ 1 mod 2, set USK I D ,t = sk I D + l 2 · hk 1 + l 1 · (hk 0 + k · x I D ) mod p. When t ≡ 0 mod 2, set USK I D ,t = sk I D + l 2 · hk 0 + l 1 · (hk 1 + k · x I D ) mod p. Finally, B answers to A I with USK I D ,t . 10) Sign: When the tuple (M, ID, t) is delivered to this oracle, B retrieves the tuple (ID, sk I D , R I D , x I D , UP K I D ) in L and the tuple (ID, HSK 0 , HSK 1 , in L. From the forking lemma [34] , when B replays the aforementioned simulation process using the identical random tape without the same selection of H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , and H 4 , A I will output another five valid signatures σ * (2) , σ * (3) , σ * (4) , σ * (5) , and σ * (6) .
By u, r I D , α, x I D , s m , and s m , we denote DLs of U, R I D , P K GC , UP K I D , HP K m , and HP K m , respectively, that is U = uP, R I D = r I D P, P K GC = Q = αP, U P K I D = x I D P, HP K m = s m P, and HP K m = s m P . Therefore, there are six equations that can be acquired from the aforementioned description as follows: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) .
In these equations, only u, r I D , α, x I D , s m , and s m are unknown to B. With the aforementioned six linear separate equations, these unknown numbers can be solved by B, where α is the DL problem's solution.
Now, we analyze the probability that B can solve the given DL problem instance. First, we define the following three events to simplify the probability analysis. , since B succeeds only if A I generates a forgery such that ID * = ID. Therefore, the probability that B solves the DL problem instance is at least
Theorem 2: The proposed CL-PKIS scheme is (t, )-strong key-insulated secure against an adversary A I in Game II defined in Section II, assuming that the (t , )-DL assumption holds in G, where
Proof: The proof of the theorem is same as that of Theorem 1. But the only difference is that the A I can inquire the Extract-Helper-Key: To respond A I 's query, B maintains a list L h = {(ID, HSK 0 , HSK 1 , HP K 0 , HP K 1 )}, which is initially empty. When an identity ID that has already been created is submitted to this oracle, B first retrieves the list L h . If L h includes (ID, HSK 0 , HSK 1 , HP K 0 , HP K 1 ), B returns HSK 0 , HSK 1 , HP K 0 , HP K 1 to A I . Otherwise, B randomly picks s 0 , s 1 ∈ Z * p , and sets HSK 0 = s 0 , HSK 1 = s 1 , HP K 0 = s 0 P, and HP K 1 = s 1 P . As a response, B will update (HSK 0 , HSK 1 , HP K 0 , HP K 1 ) into L h .
A forgery (M * , σ * (1) , ID * ) will be output by A I after finishing all queries. From the forking lemma [34] , when B replays the aforementioned simulation process using the identical random tape without the same selection of H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , HSK 0 , and HSK 1 , A I will output another three valid signatures σ * (2) , σ * (3) , and σ * (4) .
By u, r I D , α, and x I D , we denote DLs of U, R I D , P pub , and UP K I D , respectively, that is, U = uP, R I D = r I D P, P pub = Q = αP, and UP K I D = x I D P . Therefore, there are four equations that can be acquired from the aforementioned description as follows.
In these equations, only u, r I D , α, and x I D are unknown to B.
With the four aforementioned linear separate equations, these unknown numbers can be solved by B, where α is the DL problem's solution. Theorem 3: The proposed CL-PKIS scheme is (t, )perfectly key-insulated secure against an adversary A II in Game III defined in Section II, assuming that the (t , )-DL assumption holds in G, where
Proof: The proof of the theorem is same as that of Theorem 1 and the detail of the proof is omitted here.
Theorem 4: The proposed CL-PKIS scheme is (t, )-strong key-insulated secure against an adversary A II in Game IV defined in Section II, assuming that the (t , )-DL assumption 
Proof: The proof of the theorem is same as that of Theorem 2 and the detail of the proof is omitted here.
Theorem 5: The CL-PKIS scheme we have proposed has secure key updates.
Proof: For any time period t, an update key UK I D ,t of any user's identity ID can be derived from the temporary signing key USK I D ,t and USK I D ,t−1 .
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In Table I , we compare our scheme with related work in terms of the security level, strong key insulated, secure key updates, achieving frequent key-updates, and security assumption. Here, the symbol " " represents that the property we choose is fulfilled by the scheme and "×" represents that the property we choose is not by the scheme. Obviously, our proposed scheme satisfied all properties. It is evident that our signature scheme can be formally proved to be secure under the standard DL assumption, which is a weaker and well-established assumption compared to other security assumptions [35] , [36] .
To make more explicit description for the comparison of the computation efficiency, a simulation experiment that runs on a computer that is equipped with an Intel Core i7-7700 at 3.60-GHz processor as well as 8.00-GB memory is given. And the experiment is implemented in VC++ 6.0 with PBC library [37] . Regarding the pairing-based scheme [23] , [29] , [31] , to offer the security level equal to 1024-bit RSA, we adopt a supersingular curve y 2 = x 3 + x where the embedding degrees is considered as 2. q = 2 159 + 2 17 + 1 refers to a 160-bit Solinas prime and p = 12qr − 1 is a 512-bit prime. For the ECC-based scheme, to offer the security with the equivalent level, we used the Koblitz elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + ax 2 + b defined on F 2 1 6 3 providing the ECC group. The running time of the cryptographic operation is shown in Table II , which is derived by the repeated simulation experiment. Table IV is given to show theoretical evaluation of the signature length, signing cost, and verification cost where the required length and cost notations are given in Table III . The comparison of our scheme as well as existing works in terms of computation overhead has been givin in Fig. 3 . It is clear that our CL-PKIS scheme has a minimal overhead. Considering the untrusted nature of the communication channel and limited computing power of smart things in IIoT, our CL-PKIS scheme is more suitable than the existing schemes.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes the first CL-PKIS scheme without pairing, which reduces the risk of secret key disclosure in the IIoT environment. The definition and security model of the CL-PKIS scheme were formalized. After that, this paper gives a concrete CL-PKIS scheme along with the formal security proof under the DL assumption in the random oracle model. Moreover, the presented CL-PKIS scheme is able to achieve frequent key-updates while not raising the risk of the helper key exposures and ultimately enforce the system safety. Finally, theoretical analysis and experiment evaluation are given to demonstrate that the proposed CL-PKIS scheme is more useful and efficient than related CL-KIS works.
